I. THE CORRUPTION DILEMMA
The scholarship of Zephyr Teachout and Lawrence Lessig has reminded us of the classic definition of corruption. 1 Corruption in its classic sense describes something that has become impure or perverted. 2 In Aristotle's words, "The true forms of government . . . are those in which [rulers] 2 DEFINING BRIBERY [January 26, 2015] govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest . . . are perversions." 3 New York Times columnist Bob Herbert explains why our government fits the ancient definition:
The corporate and financial elites threw astounding sums of money into campaign contributions and high-priced lobbyists and think tanks and media buys and anything else they could think of. They wined and dined powerful leaders of both parties. They flew them on private jets and wooed them with golf outings and lavish vacations and gave them high-paying jobs as lobbyists the moment they left the government. All that money was well spent. The investments paid off big time. 4 In at least one sense, the practices Herbert decries are the functional equivalent of bribery. 5 Quid pro quo bribes produce decisions not in the public interest-they corrupt-and unconditional contributions and gifts do too.
Declaring that implicit agreements and understandings lie behind these practices, however, would be too cynical. The problem is not that corrupt agreements are left to winks and nods. Instead, with rare exceptions, there are no agreements, express or implied. Campaign contributions and other benefits are accompanied by hope but not by an understanding that a recipient will provide anything in return. As Herbert says, the hope may turn out to be justified often enough to make the contributions good investments. Quid pro quo exchanges are rarely how corruption happens. If a public official were to do nothing to aid one of his benefactors, the benefactor usually would not say even to himself that the official had 4 DEFINING BRIBERY [January 26, 2015] common law. 11 Both this law and the earliest bribery statutes, however, applied it only to benefits provided to judges. 12 Congress enacted its first general prohibition of bribery in 1853-a time when Aristotelian ideals of impartiality and public service were taken so seriously that paid lobbying was considered contrary to public policy and sometimes made a crime. 13 Borrowing language that once had applied only to the corruption of judges, 14 the 1853 statute forbade both "bribes" and "presents" when they were given "with intent to influence" federal officials. 15 Congress no doubt meant these words just the way they sound. Some courts still take the words "intent to influence" literally. The Fifth Circuit, for example, denied a defendant's request for an instruction that Louisiana's "intent to influence" statute did not forbid "gifts made for customary business reasons." Giving such an instruction, the court said, "would be a rank misapplication of the Louisiana bribery law. Customary business practices could embrace all sorts of extravagant favors intended to influence important business decisions." 16 2. The Adverb
The Louisiana bribery statute construed by the Fifth Circuit did not include the word "corruptly," and perhaps the court would have reached a different result if it had. A statute that forbids corruptly giving a benefit with intent to influence seems to acknowledge that not all benefits given with intent to influence are improper. Perhaps the word "corruptly" is 11 See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 118. 12 See id. at 103-04, 111; Act of April 30, 1790, Ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 117 (a bribery statute applicable only to judges). By 1798, a federal statute forbade bribing a federal "Judge, an Officer of the Customs, or an Officer of the Excise." Whether federal courts could convict people not covered by this statute of common law bribery was disputed. See United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384, 390 (C.C. Pa. 1798). In England, when officials other than judges took bribes, the common law could convict them of extortion. A bribe giver, however, could not be convicted of this crime. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 U.C.L.A. L. REV 815 (1988) . 13 See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 144-73. At least one court also held that political logrolling could be prosecuted as a common law misdemeanor. The court said that logrolling violated an official's duty "to vote in reference only to the merits." Commonwealth v. Callaghan, 4 Va. 460, 463 (1825) . 14 The first federal bribery statute forbade giving any money "or any other bribe, present or reward . . . to obtain or procure the opinion, judgment or decree of any judge or judges of the United States." Act of April 30, 1790, Ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 117.
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[January 26, 2015] crucial, and perhaps it does most of the work. This fudgy adverb might prevent "intent to influence" statutes from sweeping into their net the lobbyist's lunch, other routine entertainment, and many campaign contributions. When a federal statute uses a word that had an established meaning at common law, courts presume that Congress meant the word to retain this meaning. 17 Common law extortion (which included accepting but not giving bribes 18 ) required a "corrupt" intent. The English courts, however, did not use the word in the same way Aristotle (or his translators and interpreters) did.
From the thirteenth through the late eighteenth centuries, officials in England were entitled to collect statutory dues and customary fees for services, and the line between legitimate fee collection and extortion was sometimes murky. The courts declared that officials acted corruptly only when they realized they were not entitled to the fees they collected. "Corruptly" meant deliberately acting in violation of positive law or established norms of legitimate official conduct. 19 Judge Kozinski's reading of the word "corruptly" in a federal bribery statute echoed the common law. In a dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit, he wrote, "Conduct is corrupt if it's an improper way for a public official to benefit from his job. But what's improper turns on many different factors, such as tradition, context and current attitudes about legitimate rewards for particular officeholders." 20 Kozinski added that corruption "can't be easily captured in a single formula, as it varies too much from situation to situation." 21 Federal juries never hear an explanation of the word "corruptly" like Judge Kozinski's. Many courts see the word as doing no work at all. They have made it redundant by declaring that a person acts corruptly whenever his conduct and mental state establish the other elements of bribery. The 17 See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (quoting several earlier decisions).
18 See Lindgren, supra note , at 821 ("Bribery behavior was routinely punished as common law extortion."). The Supreme Court relied on Lindgren's scholarship when it held that the Hobbs Act, a federal extortion statute, punishes bribery. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992) ; id. at 281-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Whatever the merits of [Lindgren's] argument as a description of early English common law, it is beside the point here-the critical inquiry for our purposes is the American understanding of the crime at the time the Hobbs Act was passed in 1946."). 19 Second Circuit, for example, appeared to make felons of all lunch-buying lobbyists when it approved the following instruction: "[A] person acts corruptly . . . when he gives or offers to give something of value intending to influence . . . a government agent in connection with his official acts." 22 The Seventh Circuit held that omitting the word "corruptly" from jury instructions altogether was not plain error because "nothing in the 1962 addition of the word 'corrupt' enlarge[d] the meaning of intent as an essential element of the offense." 23 Courts that do not make the word "corruptly" redundant typically define it in language that is just as fudgy, open-ended, and evaluative as the term itself. They use the words improper, wrongful, evil, and bad. They say that corruption refers to an "improper motive or purpose," 24 an "intent to obtain an improper advantage for oneself or someone else," 25 a "wrongful or dishonest intent," 26 a "bad purpose or evil motive," 27 or a "wrongful design to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage." 28 Even on Judge Kozinski's interpretation, the word "corruptly" is vague. 29 "Intent to influence" statutes seem to require normative evaluation as well as fact-finding and mind-reading. 30 1999) . Courts also say that acting corruptly means acting "with the purpose, at least in part, of accomplishing either an unlawful end result, or a lawful end result by some unlawful method or means." See SEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL @ 18 U.S.C. § 201. Someone must have worked hard to create this ponderous way of saying that the accused must have intended to do something unlawful. 29 In fact, the D.C. Circuit held the word too vague to give fair notice to a defendant accused, not of giving a bribe, but of corruptly influencing Congress by lying to a Congressional committee. The court observed that many people attempt to influence Congress and that they are entitled to more notice of the line between proper and improper conduct than the word "corruptly" supplies. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 384-86 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 30 It is sometimes said that the criminal law cares about an actor's intention but not his motive. It's enough, for example, that a defendant charged with homicide meant to kill; it doesn't matter why he did it. But "intent to influence" statutes focus on motive. It is not 7 DEFINING BRIBERY [January 26, 2015] time when crimes were defined far less precisely than they usually are today, when juries rather than prosecutors resolved criminal cases, and when Americans had extraordinary faith in the ability of juries to determine whether defendants deserved punishment. 31 3. The Bribe Taker's Mental State "Intent to influence" describes the mental state of someone who gives a bribe. Courts and legislatures have used other language to describe the mental state of the person who takes it.
Instructions sometimes tell juries that the alleged bribe-taker's knowledge of the donor's intent to influence is enough. 32 These instructions seem to make a bribe-taker of every official who allows a lobbyist to buy him lunch. If the official is awake, he surely must realize that the lobbyist intends to influence him. The Second Circuit, however, reversed a conviction after the trial court had given an instruction of this sort. The court quoted the language of the applicable statute, which focused on the defendant's own motives rather than his knowledge of the other guy's: "[A] recipient's knowledge of a donor's intent to influence is insufficient to support conviction. The recipient must take the proffered thing of value 'intending to be influenced. '" 33 In fact, few bribe takers want to be influenced. What a bribe taker wants is a bribe, and he may regret that being influenced is the only way to get it. "Intending to be influenced" probably means "knowing that one will be influenced." sufficient that a defendant deliberately gave a thing of value to a pubic official. Someone must figure out why he did it. 31 ) (noting the trial court's instruction that the receipt of a personal or financial benefit "violates the law only if the benefit was received with the public official's understanding that it was given to influence his decision-making"); United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting the trial court's instruction that "[t]he crime is completed when the property or personal advantage is accepted by the public employee knowing that it was offered with intent that he act favorably to the person offering the property or personal advantage when necessary"); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 261 n.4 (1991) (noting an instruction that the jury must be "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the payment . . . was made . . . with the expectation that such payment would influence McCormick's official conduct, and with the knowledge on the part of McCormick that they were paid to him with that expectation"). 33 Whether the word "intent" refers to purpose or knowledge, the statutory language noted by the Second Circuit seems to validate two implausible defenses: (1) "I did not intend to be influenced because I never meant to keep my promise." And (2) "I did not intend to be influenced because I already had made up my mind. I simply agreed to do what I would have done anyway."
The second defense resembles an argument Sir Francis Bacon offered when he was tried for bribery in 1621. Bacon, the Lord Chancellor of England as well as a path-breaking philosopher and inventor of modern science, claimed that he had never allowed any of the bribes allegedly given by litigants to influence him. In fact, he said, he often ruled against the alleged bribe-giver. 34 Although the House of Lords convicted Bacon, he might have been more successful if he had been tried under 18 U.S.C. § 666, an "intent to be influenced" federal bribery statute.
Certainly U Po Kyin, George Orwell's fictional Sub-Division Magistrate of Kyauktada in Upper Burma, would escape conviction if § 666 were taken literally. Kyin always took bribes from both sides to ensure that he would decide the cases before him on strictly legal grounds. 35 Kyin did not intend to be influenced, did not know that he would be influenced, and was not in fact influenced. His case may indicate, however, that § 666 must mean something other than what it says.
The other major federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), is somewhat less troublesome. It says that a public official may not corruptly demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree to receive or accept anything of value in return for being influenced in the performance of any official act. An official who does not mean to keep his promise might nevertheless agree to accept a thing of value in return for being influenced. Perhaps this official could be convicted under § 201(b) even if he could not be convicted under § 666. Like an official charged with violating § 666, however, an official charged with violating § 201(b) could defend by saying, "I agreed to vote in favor of the Widget Subsidies Act in return for cash, but I never agreed to be influenced. I had decided to support widget subsidies long before I took the money." 34 See PETER ZAGORIN, FRANCIS BACON 22 (1999) . Seeking the king's intervention while his case was pending, Bacon wrote James I that he never had a "bribe or reward in my eye or thought when I pronounced any sentence or order." JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 352 (1984) . Some modern observers maintain that Bacon was bum-rapped by Sir Edward Coke and other political opponents, but Noonan, who provides a full account of his case, makes clear that he was not. See id. at 334-65. 35 
B. "Illegal Contract" Bribery
Someone who contributes to an official's reelection campaign or gives his daughter a nice wedding present may hope to curry the official's favor. This conduct may indeed influence the official, and critics may call it the functional equivalent of bribery. Few, however, would describe this conduct as bribery itself. It certainly is not the sort of behavior that should expose someone to imprisonment for 15 or 20 years. 36 The Seventh Circuit has commented, "Vague expectations of some future benefit should not be sufficient to make a payment a bribe." 37 As the word is most commonly used today, "bribery" probably denotes an actual or contemplated exchange of something of value for favorable governmental action, not simply a unilateral act intended to make favorable governmental action more likely.
In 1962, a commentary to the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code declared that the code's definition of bribery would preclude "application of the bribery sanction to situations where gifts are given in the mere hope of influence." 38 The MPC defines bribery as offering, giving, soliciting, or accepting a pecuniary benefit as "consideration" for an official act. 39 As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals said of a Texas bribery statute modeled on this provision, the MPC "requir[es] a bilateral arrangement-in effect an illegal contract to exchange a benefit as consideration for the performance of an official function." 40 The words "bilateral arrangement" in the Texas court's formulation might be misleading. Like "intent to influence" bribery, "illegal contract" bribery can be committed by an individual acting alone. The crime includes offers and solicitations, and it also includes transactions in which one party merely feigns agreement. An offender, however, must seek a bargain with 36 The maximum penalty for bribery under federal law is 15 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). But bribe-taking can also be prosecuted as honest-services fraud, and the maximum penalty for this crime is usually is 20 years. See 18 U.S.C. § § 1341, 1346 , the Fifth Circuit noted "that the Texas Legislature intentionally replaced 'with intent to influence' with 'any benefit in consideration for' in order to avoid application of the bribery sanction to situations where gifts are given in mere hope of influence." Because this "change in language was intended to stiffen the requirements for a bribery conviction," an indictment that described the crime as giving a benefit with intent to influence did not charge an offense under Texas law. Id. at 485.
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another person. 41 How the other person responds does not matter; the statute punishes attempted as well as completed exchanges. More than two-thirds of the states have followed MPC's lead and now embrace the "illegal contract" concept of bribery. 42
C. The Federal Amalgam
Federal bribery statutes use the words "intent to influence," but the Supreme Court's interpretation of these words has transformed them. With a shoehorn and a shove, the Court has fit the "illegal contract" concept of bribery into these "intent to influence" statutes. The Court wrote in Sun- 41 At least when the alleged bribe consists of something other than a campaign contribution, see text at notes infra, the agreement need not be express. In United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1984), for example, an official hearing challenges to tax assessments accepted payments from lawyers who practiced before him. The payments included a $4000 "referral fee" although the official provided no referral, $500 in cash passed in a white envelope under the table at a restaurant, and another $1000 passed in the men's room of a private club.
"Unlike some of [his] predecessors," the Seventh Circuit reported, the defendant in Gorny "did not receive payments based on the outcome of any specific case nor was the amount he received based on a percentage reduction of an assessment." Id. at 599. His benefactors, however, "enjoyed an unusually high rate of success in their practice before the Board." One of them won 80% of his cases and another 93% although the average rate of success was only 35%. Id. at 600.
The defendant in Gorny apparently made no promises out loud, and what cases he would fix remained unspecified. Everyone understood what the payments were for, however, and the defendant provided it by ruling in favor of his benefactors at a high rate.
A jury easily could have inferred that, at the time he accepted each payment, the defendant agreed implicitly to provide a governmental benefit in return.
Of course the line between currying favor and seeking an implicit agreement is fuzzy. One might ask whether the alleged bribe giver could legitimately have felt cheated rather than simply disappointed if the alleged bribe taker had never done anything for him. Could the donor plausibly have said to the recipient, "We never spelled it out, but we did have an understanding"? 42 See United States v. Biaggi, 674 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing 38 state statutes). One state has approved an "illegal contract" definition of bribery for bribe takers and an "intent to influence" definition for bribe givers. See MCLS § 750.118 (2014) (part of a Michigan criminal code enacted in 1931) (making it a crime to accept a benefit "under an agreement, or with an understanding that [the accepting official's] vote, opinion, or judgment shall be given in any particular manner, or on a particular side of any question"); MCLS § 750.117 (2014) (making it a crime to corruptly give any valuable thing with the purpose of influencing official action). Zephyr Teachout's statement that "most states have not adopted a quid pro quo requirement for any of their bribery laws" seems correct only in the sense that most states do not use the Latin words. See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 240. Requiring that a benefit be offered or accepted as "consideration" for favorable governmental action is no different from requiring a quid pro quo.
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Diamond Growers v. United States, 43 "Bribery requires intent 'to influence' an official act or 'to be influenced' in an official act . . . . In other words, for bribery there must be a quid pro quo-a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act." 44 "Intent to influence" and "exchange" are not different words for the same thing. Some of the 179 people who "bundled" more than $500,000 apiece for President Obama's 2012 reelection campaign 45 undoubtedly hoped to influence governmental action-perhaps by increasing the likelihood of their own appointment as ambassadors. 46 One would be surprised, however, to learn of any quid pro quo or corrupt understanding at the time they gave their support. As courts have recognized, giving something with a "generalized hope of ultimate benefit on the part of the donor" is not a bribe. 47 The Supreme Court might better have grounded its quid pro quo requirement on the word "corruptly." Norms have changed since Congress enacted its first general bribery statute in 1853, 48 and many benefits intended to influence are not seen as improper today. Before the Supreme Court declared that "intent to influence" and "quid pro quo" meant the same thing, a few lower courts had in fact found a quid pro quo requirement in the word "corruptly." 49 Under the Supreme Court's decisions, a quid pro quo usually can be 12 DEFINING BRIBERY [January 26, 2015] implied rather than express. In McCormick v. United States, 50 however, the Court held that campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when "the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act." 51 Although the Eleventh Circuit has concluded (dubiously) that a later Supreme Court decision modified McCormick, 52 at least six other courts of appeals insist that an explicit agreement remains necessary. 53 McCormick did not rest its requirement of an "explicit" quid pro quo on the language of the statute. 54 The case arose under an extortion statute, the Hobbs Act, which federal courts had construed to reach bribe-taking although its language simply forbade obtaining property "under color of official right." 55 Without parsing this language, the Court emphasized the danger of allowing prosecutors and jurors to infer corrupt bargains from the conduct of campaign contributors and elected officials. It said that Congress would be required to speak clearly if it wished to demand less than an explicit agreement:
To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private contributions. It would require statutory language more specific than the Hobbs Act contains to justify a contrary conclusion. 56 Although the Supreme Court embraced the "illegal contract" concept of 50 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 51 Id. at 273. The trial court had given an "intent to influence" instruction. The Supreme Court reversed because, at least in a case involving campaign contributions, this sort of instruction is erroneous. 52 bribery in 1991, pattern jury instructions in most circuits continue to recite the language of federal bribery statutes without elaboration. Juries rarely hear the words quid pro quo or the words express, implied, or agreement. They hear only that bribe givers and bribe takers must intend to influence or to be influenced. 57 Many defense attorneys are so inept that they fail to complain about these instructions. Especially from the perspective of the jury box, the federal law of bribery is a muddle.
III. EFFORTS TO BEND, BREAK, OR CIRCUMVENT THE QUID PRO QUO REQUIREMENT
Because federal bribery statutes as construed by the Supreme Court fall far short of proscribing every functional equivalent of bribery, prosecutors, lower court judges, legislators, and other corruption fighters look for ways to stretch or get around them. The Supreme Court sometimes seems to be engaged in a tug of war with everyone else.
A. Honest Services Fraud
Particularly in the 1970s, prosecutors persuaded the lower federal courts that the federal mail fraud statute forbade schemes to deprive the public of "the intangible right of honest services." In 1987, however, the Supreme Court held that this statute outlawed depriving people of property, not an illdefined intangible right of honest services. 58 The Justice Department then complained to Congress that the Court had deprived it of an important tool in its battle against corruption. Congress responded by enacting a statute that read in full, "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or 57 artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 59 This statute enabled lower federal court judges, like the priests of ancient Delphi, to explicate language ordinary mortals could not understand. 60 In United States v. Sawyer 61 and United States v. Woodward, 62 for example, the First Circuit upheld the convictions of a lobbyist who had lavishly entertained a legislator and of the legislator himself. The well-entertained legislator had supported almost all of the lobbyist's agenda. After noting that bribery was an established category of honest services fraud, the court announced that it would expand this category "from quid pro quo bribery, to include a more generalized pattern of gratuities to coax 'ongoing favorable official action.'" 63 It said that juries should be instructed that it is lawful for lobbyists to entertain legislators to cultivate "business or personal friendship" but felonious for them to do so "to cause the recipient to alter her official acts." 64 The court observed that the benefits it made criminal "may not be very different, except in degree, from routine cultivation of friendship in a lobbying context." 65 The First Circuit grounded its rulings in Sawyer and Woodward on the legislator's failure to disclose the conflict of interest created by his relationship with the lobbyist:
A public official has an affirmative duty to disclose material information to the public employer. When an official fails to disclose a personal interest in a matter over which she has decision-making power, the public is deprived of its right either to disinterested decision making itself or, as the case may be, to full disclosure as to the official's potential motivation. 66 
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Punishing undisclosed conflicts of interest may sound like a fine idea, at least when the idea goes by fast. A conflicting interest, however, is any interest that might divert an official from faithful service to the public. When the official's decision will benefit a member of his family, he has a conflict of interest. When his decision will benefit a business partner or good friend, he again has a conflict. When his decision will benefit an important political supporter, he has a conflict. When his decision will benefit a lobbyist who has taken him on golf outings, he once more has a conflict. When this official's action will benefit anyone at all who done any favor for which he is grateful, he has a conflict of interest. Conflicts are ubiquitous. 67 No official could compile a list of all his conflicts, and if he could, he would not know where to post it. How does one go about disclosing a conflict of interest to a disembodied public employer? Would a "my conflicts" section on the official's Facebook page be sufficient? When no official ever has or ever could disclose every conflict, criminalizing undisclosed conflicts looks like a way to enable prosecutors to pick their targets. 68 The Supreme Court did not consider the meaning or the constitutionality of the honest services statute until 22 years after its enactment. Then, in 2010, in Skilling v. United States, 69 three justices declared in a concurring opinion that they would hold the statute unconstitutionally vague, 70 and the remaining justices acknowledged that the defendant's "vagueness challenge has force." 71 The majority concluded, however, that the statute could be saved by confining it to a "solid core" that every lower court had recognized. 72 "[H]onest-services fraud does not encompass conduct more wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and kickbacks," the 67 Show me a public official without conflicts of interest, and I will show you an official without any social life, work life, family life, religious life, or political life. 68 Cf. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., concurring) ("The conflict of interest theory, unhinged from an external disclosure standard, places too potent a tool in the hands of zealous prosecutors who may be guided by their own political motivations . . . [and who] might also feel political pressure to pursue certain state or local officials.").
A court or legislature can reduce the reach of a prohibition of undisclosed conflicts by requiring that an official's non-disclosure violate a federal, state, or local reporting requirement. This limitation, however, poses problems of its own. See Albert W. Alschuler The Court not only rejected the government's argument that the statute criminalized failing to disclose a conflict of interest but also warned Congress that a statute embracing this standard might be held unconstitutional. 75 Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, promptly declared that the Supreme Court had "sided with an Enron executive convicted of fraud" and "undermined Congressional efforts to protect hardworking Americans from powerful interests." 76 In 2012, the Senate approved without noticeable opposition a Leahy-sponsored proposal to restore 20-year penalties for some undisclosed conflicts of interest. 77 The House Judiciary Committee unanimously approved this proposal as well, 78 but the majority leader of the House never brought it to a vote. 79 Because Congress failed to enact the Leahy proposal, the post-Skilling honest services statute remains compatible with the Supreme Court's quid pro quo requirement, at least for now. The Supreme Court may be winning the tug of war.
B. "Stream of Benefits" or "Course of Conduct" Bribery
In United States v. Kemp, 80 the Third Circuit upheld a jury instruction declaring, "[W]here there is a stream of benefits given by a person to favor a public official, . . . it need not be shown that any specific benefit was given in exchange for a specific official act." 81 In United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 82 the Ninth Circuit declared that accepting a "retainer" with "the understanding that when the payor comes calling, the government official will do whatever is asked" is bribery. 83 Fifth Circuit said, "[A] particular, specified act need not be identified at the time of payment to satisfy the quid pro quo requirement, so long as the payor and payee agreed upon a specific type of action to be taken in the future." 85 In United States v. Jennings, 86 the Fourth Circuit observed, "[T]he intended exchange in bribery can be 'this for these' or 'these for these,' not just 'this for that.'" 87 And in United States v. Ganim, 88 the Second Circuit wrote, "[S]o long as the jury finds that an official accepted gifts in exchange for a promise to perform official acts for the giver, it need not find that the specific act to be performed was identified at the time of the promise." 89 These declarations seem inconsistent with two descriptions of bribery by the Supreme Court. The Court wrote in Evans v. United States, 90 "The offense is complete at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his engagement to perform specific official acts." 91 It added in Sun-Diamond Growers v. United States 92 that, at least under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), a bribe must be given "for or because of some particular official act." 93 These statements have led bribery defendants to argue that the government failed to identify any "particular official act" or "specific official act" they agreed to perform. Even if they agreed in general terms do something helpful to their benefactors, the "something" remained unspecified.
As best I can tell, these defendants have never been successful. 94 For them, the Supreme Court's statements have been a snare and a delusion. In bribery as in baseball, there appears to be no good reason why a transaction may not include a player to be named later. If a public official named Genie were to agree to grant three wishes in exchange for a deposit to her Cayman Islands bank account, she surely should be convicted of bribery. Moreover, an agreement to provide unspecified benefits need not be express. A corrupt agreement sometimes can be inferred simply from the regular flow of 85 Id. at 350 (emphasis in the original). 86 benefits in both directions. 95 The principal danger of the "stream of benefits" concept of bribery is nearly the opposite of the one defendants have suggested. It is not that prosecutors and juries may fail to identify precisely the action a public official agreed to perform. It is that they may fail to identify any benefit an official accepted in exchange for a promise of official action. Although the "stream of benefits" metaphor can be compatible with the quid pro quo requirement, it invites slippage from this requirement to a "one hand washes the other" or "favoritism" standard.
Every definition of bribery looks to the moment a benefit is received. Bribery can be committed before this moment-the crime includes offers and solicitations-but it cannot be committed after. A payment cannot become a bribe retrospectively-not even when its recipient later acts to benefit its donor, not even when the recipient is motivated in whole or in part by gratitude to the donor, and not even when the recipient hopes to encourage further favors. As Justice Stevens wrote in a dissenting opinion, "When the petitioner took the money, he was either guilty or not guilty." 96 Words and actions that follow the receipt of a benefit may supply evidence of what the donor and recipient intended when it was received, but they cannot transform a benefit that was lawful at that moment into a bribe.
Some bribery statutes proscribe giving or accepting benefits with intent to influence. Others proscribe giving or accepting benefits as "consideration" for official acts. Under either definition, favoritism following the receipt of a benefit is not bribery; cronyism is not bribery; "steering" contracts is not bribery; and "one hand washes the other" is not bribery. These things are not good government. They are corrupt in the classic Aristotelian sense of the word. They sometimes may be the result of bribery and sometimes may evidence bribery. But they are not bribery. If an official were subject to imprisonment whenever a jury could be persuaded that he had acted deliberately to benefit someone who once did a favor for him, only a fool would take the job. The circumstances must warrant an inference that, at the time the official accepted one or more of the benefits in the stream, he agreed at least implicitly to provide something in return.
The dangers of the watery metaphor are illustrated by a case I lost, that of former Illinois governor George H. Ryan. The jury in Ryan's case was directed to convict him if he failed to disclose a conflict of interest, but after the Supreme Court held in Skilling that failing to disclose a conflict of 95 A very clear illustration is United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1984), described in note supra. 96 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992) ("The offense is complete at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his engagement to perform specific official acts.").
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[January 26, 2015] interest was no crime, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the jury must have convicted him of taking bribes. The court focused particularly on the award of a government contract to a lobbying client of co-defendant Lawrence Warner. Warner was a political associate and family friend who had done favors for Ryan and members of his family. The court quoted and approved the district court's conclusion that Ryan's reason for approving the contract must have been either to promote effective law enforcement, as he claimed, or else to compensate Warner for the stream of benefits he provided, as the Government urged. The jury rejected the good faith motive. [97] Accordingly, the jury could only have convicted him on this count if it believed his conduct was a response to the stream of benefits. . . . The court concludes that the jury must have found Ryan accepted gifts from Warner with the intent to influence his actions. 98
The court spoke of "compensate[ing] Warner for the stream of benefits" and of "accept[ing] gifts from Warner with the intent to influence [Ryan's] actions" as though they were the same thing. But the gifts obviously came at an earlier point than the "compensation." These gifts might have been unconditional and legitimate even if they inspired gratitude and did prompt later "compensation." By equating subsequent favoritism for a benefactor with bribery, the court concluded that the jury must have found bribery. Its analysis placed every public official at risk.
IV. WHY DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY SHOULD REMAIN UNDER-INCLUSIVE
For once, the Supreme Court has the law just right: "[F]or bribery, there must be a quid pro quo-a specific intent to give or receive something in exchange for an official act," 99 and campaign contributions may be treated 97 Under the instructions, the jury could have found a lack of good faith simply because Ryan failed to disclose a conflict of interest, and it might have found nondisclosure of a conflict even if Ryan's only reason for approving the contract was to promote effective law enforcement. For present purposes, disregard that difficulty and assume that the jury did reject Ryan's claim that his only reason for approving the contract was to advance the public good. Imagine that Ryan acted in whole or in part to benefit his friend Warner and that the jury so found. 98 as bribes only when "the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking . . . to perform or not to perform an official act." 100 In a concurring opinion one year after McCormick required an "explicit" quid pro quo for campaign contributions alleged to be bribes, Justice Kennedy objected to the Court's requirement: "The official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods." 101 As the reference to winks and nods suggests, it grates that McCormick places a premium on indirection. The Supreme Court has made achieving the functional equivalent of bribery so easy that one may wonder why anyone ever resorts to the real thing. The only thing that can be said for the Supreme Court's "explicit" quid pro quo requirement is that the alternative would be worse.
Whenever an elected official adheres to the positions that prompted contributors to support him, he exhibits a pattern of favoritism for these contributors. This pattern may bespeak conviction, not corruption. Ambitious prosecutors and cynical jurors, however, can easily infer a corrupt agreement from the common pattern. When an official has supported widget subsidies after accepting large contributions from widget manufacturers, for example, prosecutors and jurors may infer that there must have been an implicit understanding. Allowing inferences of this sort whenever officials have acted to benefit contributors could make public life intolerable. One state has gone beyond McCormick by declaring that a properly reported campaign contribution may not be treated as a bribe at all. 102 A narrow definition of bribery like McCormick's reduces the likelihood of "inferences" based on cynicism.
As a special prerogative of their position, law school teachers are allowed to pose hypothetical cases that never could happen. I therefore invite you imagine that the great philosopher Aristotle, resurrected from the dead, is elected governor of New Jersey.
Unlike anyone who has actually been governor of New Jersey, Aristotle gives no thought to his own welfare of that of his family, friends, and supporters. He believes that "governments which rule with a view to the private interest . . . are perversions." 103 Aristotle is incorruptible, and his focus on the public good never falters.
But people who have done favors for him and members of his family. And when the inevitable happens, critics point to Aristotle and say, "Aha! Behold! One hand washes the other. We always knew that guy was no different from the rest of them." The United States Attorney ultimately charges Aristotle with bribery, extortion, honest services fraud, and racketeering. He says that Aristotle accepted benefits that he must have known were intended to influence him and, further, that he must have intended to be influenced. The prosecutor adds that Aristotle failed to disclose the conflicts of interest created by many of the benefits he received. He invites jurors to infer that there must have been an unspoken understanding that Aristotle would reciprocate in some unspecified way for the favors he received.
The jurors, many of whom entered the jury box with the conviction that most politicians are corrupt, 104 are astonished by the number of charges. They convict on every count. The trial judge then lectures Aristotle on how serious a wrong it is to betray the public trust. He sentences Aristotle to five years, less than the 20 years proposed by the prosecutor.
Defense attorneys and public officials who have been convicted of misconduct typically maintain that federal prosecutors can convict anyone they like. 105 The complaint sounds like an alibi, but broad definitions of bribery bring it close to the truth. Whenever the law of bribery is not underinclusive, it is over-inclusive. There is no Goldilocks position. Indeed, the law of bribery may be radically under-inclusive and radically over-inclusive at the same time. It may leave many functional equivalents of bribery untouched while sending Aristotle to prison. That's the corruption dilemma.
V. EX ANTE REGULATIONS AND WHY THEY MUST BE UNDER-INCLUSIVE TOO
Zephyr Teachout writes, "Once corruption is understood as a description of an emotional orientation, rather than a description of contract-like exchange, the idea of criminalizing it seems either comical or fascist." 106 Speaking of the kinds of rules commonly found in ethical codes and campaign finance regulations, she observes, "The emotional nature of corruption makes it better suited for bright-line rules that are unconcerned with intent. Teachout makes sense. It is only fair to tell officials and their benefactors what they may and may not do before they act. Rather than allow jurors to infer that Croesus, a wealthy industrialist, must have intended to influence Solon, a state legislator, when he entertained Solon at his ranch and gave him a $25,000 campaign contribution, the law should tell Croesus and Solon in advance whether an industrialist may entertain a legislator and make a $25,000 contribution. When corrupting benefits take the form of campaign contributions, however, the Supreme Court has largely blocked the most appropriate form of regulation, making expansion of the bribery net more likely. 108 Although Teachout's position is sound and sensible, anyone who attempts to draft a code of ethics for public officials will soon learn that this code cannot block all functional equivalents of bribery. The range of corrupting practices is wide-soliciting and accepting gifts, accepting invitations to social events, accepting invitations to professional conferences, accepting honoraria for speeches, accepting royalties for publications, accepting referral fees, accepting investment advice, participating in privately funded fact-finding missions, creating or lending support to charities, owning stock and other passive investments, engaging in remunerative employment or private business ventures, negotiating for future private employment, accepting post-government employment, and more.
Drawing appropriate lines is challenging. Should Croesus entertain Solon less lavishly than his other friends, refusing to invite him to the ranch but meeting him later at Denny's? Must Solon, having accepted a public trust, remain cloistered like the members of an ascetic religious order, refusing to accept hospitality worth more than $50 even from old friends? Would it be better just to require Solon to report as a gift any entertainment intent. The intent they sometimes require, however, is simply an intent to cross the bright lines they set forth. No speculation about deeper motivation is required. 108 For criticism of the Supreme Court's failure to recognize that campaign contributions are hybrids of protected speech and unprotected gifts to candidates and that they differ greatly from other funds used to bring speech to audiences, see Albert W. Alschuler he receives worth more than $50? 109 If Solon serves part-time as most do state legislators do, 110 who may patronize his law firm, insurance brokerage, or real estate agency? Who may give his spouse, adult child, or niece a job? Who may contribute to his favorite charity-or his spouse's favorite charity? 111 Wherever the lines are drawn, people seeking favor are likely go beyond 109 Mandating disclosure is the regulation of easiest resort. As Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider observe, "[T]he intervention is soft and leaves everything substantive alone." Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 681 (2011). This regulatory technique addresses a problem (or makes a show of it) without notably affecting the public treasury. People burdened by the new regulations often do not protest lest they be thought to have something to hide. More information (and more and more) is thought to facilitate wiser decisions, although no one is likely to read it. Ben-Shahar and Schneider conclude, "Mandated disclosure is a Lorelei, luring lawmakers onto the rocks of regulatory failure." Id. at 181.
To be sure, the utility of disclosure varies from one situation to the next. When opponents, the press, and watchdog groups review the mandated disclosures of political candidates and elected officials, they discover things the public should know. The disclosures of candidates and elected officials often do not convey useful information, however, see LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 251-60, and the disclosures of less prominent public employees are likely to remain unread on the Internet and in file drawers.
Compliance with reporting requirements is also likely to be burdensome. Abner Mikva, a former Member of Congress, former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, former White House counsel, and recent recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, declared, "[W]e already require the filing of too many forms. Every year all of our senior officials spend countless hours filling out countless disclosure forms. . . . The reports are so complicated that most reviewers can't understand what they are reviewing, but they do serve as wonderful traps to snare the unwary official." Abner J. Mikva, From Politics to Paranoia: Misguided Ethics Laws Have Given Us More Mistrust, Not Less, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at C2. Mikva observed, "[G]overnment cannot daily prove its rectitude to the cynic convinced of government's corruption." Id.
110 See MARGARET ROBERTSON FERGUSON, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF STATE GOVERNMENT: PEOPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 191 (2006) (noting that the work of a state legislator is a full-time job in only 11 states). 111 In Louisiana, Supriya Jindal created the Supriya Jindal Foundation for Louisiana's Children shortly after her husband, Bobby Jindal, became the state's governor. The Jindal Foundation provides high-tech equipment to schools, and Mrs. Jindal travels throughout the state to deliver this equipment personally. One early contributor to the foundation was AT&T, which gave $250,000. At about the same time, AT&T sought the governor's approval of an arrangement for providing television cable services. Marathon Oil, which also gave $250,000, sought an increase in the amount of oil it could refine at its facility in Louisiana. The governor's press secretary said of the foundation, "It is a completely nonpolitical, nonpartisan organization created by the first lady, who as an engineer and the mother of three children, has a passion for helping our young people learn science and math. Anything other than this reality has plainly been dreamed up by partisan hacks living in a fantasy land. 
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[January 26, 2015] them. The authors of an ethical code may determine that the code should not require the spouses, parents, children, nieces, nephews, and political associates of public officials to refuse customary gifts and social invitations or to decline ordinary business opportunities. This judgment, however, will create an opening for favor-seekers. When people who may be interested in doing business with the state send silver to family weddings and flowers to family funerals, critics may howl about loopholes and functional equivalents. 112 The effect of ex ante regulation often may be to substitute weaker for stronger conflicts of interest. In fact, giving a job to an officeholder's favorite nephew is usually not the functional equivalent of promising postgovernment employment to the officeholder himself. Although regulations have hydraulic effects, one should not assume that they can neither reduce the amount of money devoted to buying influence nor increase the cost of buying it. 113 The impossibility of suppressing all functional equivalents of bribery though either corrupt-intent bribery laws or ex ante regulations may lead one to say with Rutherford B. Hayes, "Law is no substitute for character." 114 Hayes's observation is noble and spot-on, but it may not be of great comfort in a world in which all of us have been banished from the Garden.
VI. FROM STEVENSON TO BLAGOJEVICH: HAS THE EFFORT TO CLEAN UP GOVERNMENT THROUGH CRIMINAL PROSECUTION MADE THINGS BETTER?
Over the past 60 years, Congress has given prosecutors an ever-larger arsenal of tools for fighting corruption. 115 117 The number of officials prosecuted annually by the federal government today is about 800. 118 Perhaps the federal effort to lock up public officials has given America better and less corrupt government, but if it has, the public has not noticed. The percentage of Americans who believe that "quite a few" government officials are "crooked" has doubled in 50 years (from 24% in 1958 to 51% in 2008), 119 and the percentage of people who believe they can trust the federal government most of the time has dropped by more than two-thirds in 30 years (from 70% in 1980 to 22% in 2010). 120 Forty-seven percent of the public say that most members of Congress are corrupt (slightly more than say that most are not corrupt). 121 An impressionistic glance toward seem never to speak of giving "tools" to defense attorneys. 116 123 Your speculation about whether federal corruption prosecutions have made things better or worse is as good as mine. My own guess, however, is "both." My sense is that officials like Powell have become less common than they were 60 years ago, and so have officials like Stevenson. Federal corruption prosecutions may have played a part in both stories.
Although the F.B.I. found $90,000 in cash in Congressman William Jefferson's freezer in 2005, 124 corruption prosecutions today rarely involve shoeboxes stuffed with cash or offshore bank accounts. The officials who wind up in prison are likely to be figures like Alabama Governor Don Siegelman, accused of agreeing to appoint someone to a state board in exchange for financial support of a program to generate education funds, 125 and Robert Sorich, a Chicago mayoral aide accused of patronage hiring in violation of a civil consent decree. 126 The public's greater mistrust of public 27 DEFINING BRIBERY [January 26, 2015] officials may reflect changed standards or simply a more resentful mood rather than either the officials' changed behavior or the public's changed perception of what they do. 127 If shoeboxes full of cash are indeed rarer today, perhaps the reason is that public officials and their corruptors now have more class. They may have learned that campaign contributions and other "functional equivalents," even if not "equivalent," are plenty good enough. Cash bribes may have become infrequent not only because they are criminal but also because they are unnecessary. I am inclined to believe, however, that deterrence through criminal punishment has played a part. 128 Deterring bribery is an excellent idea, but deterring Adlai Stevenson from running for office is not. Federal corruption prosecutions might have made twenty-first century Stevensons less likely to enter politics for two reasons.
First, these prosecutions reflect and reinforce the dark view of politicians voiced by economists, taxi drivers, and radio talk-show callers. When office-holders are presumed corrupt, many virtuous people may find the game not worth playing. Daniel Patrick Moynihan commented, "[P]olitics, business, and war have ever been the affairs of adventurers and risk takers," 129 and Moynihan's observation may be especially true today. The adventurers still attracted to the game may be more likely than today's Adlai Stevensons to cut corners. Criminal prosecutions probably have contributed to rather than ameliorated the public's sense that most politicians are "crooked."
Second, corruption prosecutions reinforce the sense that running for office means entering a world of sharpened knives. Although a twenty-first century Stevenson might not be concerned that seeking office could land him in the cell next to Aristotle's, he could not avoid noticing that to enter 127 Few public officials banish altogether from their thoughts and actions the impulse to aid friends and supporters and to encourage further support. Unfortunate though their favoritism may be, even the best officials are likely to give friends and supporters a leg up.
This conduct once did not spark moral indignation. When cronyism went too far and appeared to compromise the public interest, political opponents might complain; people might call for more civil service reform or competitive bidding; and voters might fail to reelect an official. But no one seemed to demand long prison terms. 128 politics is to enter a jungle. Candidates today must not only be wary of the knives of others but also consider how sharp a knife to wield themselves. A present day Stevenson might well conclude that, if he wants to be successful, he cannot remain Adlai Stevenson. Although journalists, political consultants, and politicians have done more than prosecutors to make politics a game of gotcha, prosecutors have played a part. 130
VII. CONCLUSION
Government corruption stirs resentment. It unites almost everyone, including members of both the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party movements. When public officials and their benefactors can engage in 130 The Justice Department censured U.S. Attorney Thomas DiBiagio after a newspaper learned of memoranda he had sent his staff. DiBiagio told his subordinates that he wanted three "front page" white collar or public corruption indictments by November 6, a date close to election day. See Editorial, A Vote of No Confidence, WASH. POST, July 20, 2004, at A16, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63069-2004Jul19.html. In view of the incentives of the U.S. Attorney's office, one commentator expressed surprise that anyone was surprised. See George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials after Sabri, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 403, 403 (2005) . When a Justice Department task force examined the removal of nine United States Attorneys during the administration of President George W. Bush, it found evidence that some had been encouraged to file prosecutions for political reasons. In what was probably the most egregious case, the task force documented a stream of phone calls and other communications from Republican office holders and party officials to David Iglesias, the United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico. The communications encouraged faster and more vigorous prosecution of Democrats in two corruption cases and a voting fraud case.
A call late in the series came on October 26, 2006, shortly before the elections of that year. In an apparent reference to one of the corruption cases, U.S. Senator Pete Domenici asked whether he could expect an indictment before November. Iglesias answered that he did not think so. Domenici said, "Well, I'm very sorry to hear that," and hung up.
On Even when prosecutors are not partisan and are not subject to outside pressure, they are likely to view a state's governor in the same way a big game hunter views a cape buffalo.
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[January 26, 2015] practices that resemble bribery and escape punishment, people get angry. Nearly everyone appears to favor broader anti-corruption laws. They may assume that the only reason these laws don't exist already is that lawmakers are corrupt and want to stay that way. This article has argued, however, that broader anti-corruption laws generally make things worse. It has traced the history of two competing concepts of bribery-the "intent to influence" concept and the "illegal contract" concept-and it has taken the language of various definitions of bribery more seriously than this language often has been taken.
"Intent to influence" may be an appropriate standard when applied to benefits given to appointed judges (both in the seventeenth century and today), but it is a preposterous standard when applied in the twenty-first century to people who must collect donations to run for office and who are appropriately subject to persuasion in a wide variety of social settings bearing little resemblance to a courtroom. The "illegal contract" concept is more appropriate.
Although the Supreme Court's refusal to treat campaign contributions as bribes in the absence of an "explicit" quid pro quo is easily criticized ("That's not how it's done!"), inviting inferences of criminal behavior whenever the actions of elected officials have benefitted donors to their campaigns would be worse. The Supreme Court has appropriately rebuffed efforts to use a statute criminalizing deprivations of "the intangible right of honest services" to scuttle the quid pro quo requirement. Moreover, although the currently fashionable "stream of benefits" metaphor can be compatible with the "illegal contract" concept of bribery, courts should not allow talk of streams, retainers, meal plans, and open bars to degenerate into a "one hand washes the other" or "favoritism" standard.
Broad definitions of bribery not only sweep into their net common and widely accepted behavior. They also invite unjustified inferences and empower prosecutors to pick their targets. Most people, however, toot only one horn of the corruption dilemma.
